Legislation and Policy Brief
Volume 7

Issue 1

Article 3

2017

Empowering American Victims of International Organized Crime:
Proposing an Amendment to Clarify RICO's Extraterritorial
Application
Lisa Lindhorst
George Washington University Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/lpb
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, International Law Commons, and the Legislation Commons

Recommended Citation
Lindhorst, Lisa (2017) "Empowering American Victims of International Organized Crime: Proposing an
Amendment to Clarify RICO's Extraterritorial Application," Legislation and Policy Brief: Vol. 7 : Iss. 1 ,
Article 3.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/lpb/vol7/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews
at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Legislation and Policy Brief by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College
of Law. For more information, please contact kclay@wcl.american.edu.

Vol. 7.1

LEGISLATION & POLICY BRIEF

51

EMPOWERING AMERICAN VICTIMS OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME:
PROPOSING AN AMENDMENT TO CLARIFY
RICO'S EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION
LISA LINDHORST*

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 52

I.

BACKGROUND ........................................................................................... 53

A.

UNDERSTANDING RICO: A PowERFUL TooL To COMBAT
ORGANIZED CRIMINAL ACTIVITY ................................................. 54

B. THE HISTORY AND CURRENT JUDICIAL FRAMEWORK ON
RICO'S EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION .................................. 55

1.
2.

THE STRICT DOMESTIC RESTRICTIONS ON CIVIL RIC0 .......... 56
THE LIBERAL EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF
CRIMINAL RICO ...................................................................... 58

3.

CONGRESS INTENDED TO APPLY RICO
ExTRATERRITORIALL Y ............................................................... 59

IL ANALYSIS ................................................................................................ 60
A. CRITIQUE OF THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK COURTS USE TO
APPLY RICO ExTRATERRITORIALLY ............................................. 61
B. PROPOSAL: AN AMENDMENT THAT CLARIFIES RICO's
APPLICABILITY TO EXTRATERRITORIAL CONDUCT ....................... 62

1.
2.
3.
III.

THE LANGUAGE OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT .................... 63
ADV ANT AGES OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT ....................... 63
POTENTIAL CRITICISMS OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT ....... 65

CoNCLUSION .......................................................................................... 66

52

EMPOWERING AMERICAN VICTIMS OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZED CRIME
INTRODUCTION

The twenty-five year old Ms. Valerie Candy worked hard to earn
her academic success, her spot on numerous honor societies, and her
successful career. 1 She was ready to take a breath, relax, and revel in
the life she created for herself. 2 As she boarded Pan Am flight 103
to visit her parents for the holidays she was filled with excitement,
anticipating their reaction to the news that she and her fiance were to
marry over Christmas. 3 Unfortunately for Ms. Candy and 199 other
Americans, December 21 51 of1988 marked the last day they would ever
talk to their loved ones. 4 Minutes into the flight, as Pan Am 103 crossed
over Lockerbie, Scotland, a bomb exploded, and sent the passengers'
plummeting to the ground. 5 This horrific incident occurred two years
after an attack by the same association of Libyan terrorists on a UTA
flight that killed several Americans, including the wife of a U.S.
Ambassador. 6
Despite the grave harm organized crime inflicts upon U.S. citizens
extraterritorially,7 the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RIC0) 8 is no longer available as a tool for individuals to combat
these injustices. RICO is a U.S. federal law that provides criminal
penalties and civil causes of action for crimes performed as part of
an ongoing criminal organization. 9 The application of this powerful
statute to extraterritorial crime is a source of great controversy. Before
2010, courts applied RICO extraterritorially whenever there was a
substantial connection between the criminal activity and U.S. territory. 10
This liberal application of RICO abroad changed drastically after the
famous Morrison Supreme Court opinion in 2010, which announced a
presumption that a statute is restricted domestically in the absence of a
clear indication" that it applies beyond U.S. borders.11
11

' J.D. Candidate at The George Washington University Law School, expected 2015
See MATTHEW Coz & ToM FOSTER, THEIR DARKEST DAY: THE TRAGEDY OF PAN AM
OF HorE, 67 (Grove Press, 1992).

1

2
3

103

AND hs LEGACY

See id.

Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Kimberly Kindy, Families of Americans Killed in 1989 Bombing See Victory Over Libya Nullified,
WASHINGTON PosT (Dec. 23, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2008/12/22/ AR2008122202050.html.
7
Meaning wholly outside the boundaries of United States jurisdiction.
8
18 UNITED STATES CoDE (U.S.C.) §§ 1961-1968 was enacted on October 15, 1970, as Title IX of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.
9
Id. Although largely directed at crimes economic in nature, these "acts" include most crimes
classified as felonies, such as acts of terrorism. See id. § 1961.
10
This was called the "conducts and effects" test. See, infra Section II.B.1
11
See Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
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Courts have dismissed almost every civil extraterritorial RICO claim
since Morrison, claiming that no such clear indication" exists within
the RICO statute. 12 Conversely, the criminal provisions of this same
RICO statute escape the domestic limitations of Morrison altogether.
Courts extend the narrow Bowman Supreme Court opinion, which
affords prosecutors extraterritorial latitude in cases involving national
security, to immunize criminal RICO from the Morrison presumption. 13
The bright-line Morrison rule and porous Bowman standard are
incoherent when they collide in the context of a statute like RICO,
which imposes both criminal and civil liability. 14 The asymmetry that
courts currently tolerate confuses case law and erodes the power of U.S
victims of organized crime.
/1

To clarify the inconsistency and confusion plaguing case law
on RICO' s extraterritorial application, this Article proposes an
amendment to the RICO statute that clarifies the scope of RICO' s
extraterritorial reach. 15 This proposed amendment comports with
Supreme Court precedent and RICO's legislative intent, and protects
U.S. citizens from victimization of crimes abroad by optimizing the
deterrent value of RICO. Section II overviews the RICO statute and
the case law grappling with RICO' s extraterritorial application, Section
III highlights the shortcomings of the current RICO framework and
proposes an amendment to rectify these shortcomings, and Section IV
briefly concludes.
I.

BACKGROUND

RICO' s reputation as one of the most powerful federal tools to
combat organized crime16 is currently at risk. The domestic limitations
courts impose on RICO's civil provisions and the inconsistencies that
plague the case law grappling with RICO' s extraterritorial application,
drastically curtail the once powerful reach of this statute. RICO, which
is part of the 1970 Organized Crime and Control Act, was Congress'
attempt to prevent organized criminal enterprises from continuing
to drain billions of dollars from the U.S. economy every year.17
Specifically, RICO permits suits against individuals that conduct the
affairs of a criminal enterprise through a "pattern of racketeering
See e.g., Cedeno v. Intech Grp., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 2d 471, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Norex Petroleum
Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 631 F.3d 29, 33 (2d Cir. 2010).
13
See United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
14
S. Nathan Williams, The Sometimes "Craven Watchdog": The Disparate Criminal-Civil Application
Of The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 63 DuKE L. J. 1381, 1384 (2014).
15
See, infra Section III.B.l.
16
See Thomas P. Ott, Responding to the Threat of International Organized Crime: A Primer on Programs,
Profiles, and Practice Points, 60 U.S. ATTYs' BuLLETIN 1, 14 (2012).
12

17

Id.
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activity." 18 To foster the background necessary to understand the
value in the proposed amendment, Section A defines core RICO terms
and highlights the differences between civil and criminal RICO, and
Section B discusses the case law grappling with RICO' s extraterritorial
application.
A. UNDERSTANDING RICO: A PowERFUL TooL To COMBAT
ORGANIZED CRIMINAL ACTIVITY

RICO provides a statutory cause of action against individuals that
are involved in a criminal enterprise- or association - that engaged in
two or more related "racketeering" crimes within a certain time period.
A violation of the RICO statute, regardless of whether the action is
criminal or civil, requires (1) proof of the existence of an enterprise,
(2) proof of racketeering activity (3) proof of a pattern between these
racketeering acts; and (4) proof that the enterprise engaged in or affected
interstate or foreign commerce. 19 18 U.S.C. § 1961 defines several key
terms, such as "racketeering activity," "enterprise" and "pattern." 20
An "enterprise" includes any individual, partnership, corporation,
association or other legal entity, and any group of individuals associated
in fact although not a legal entity. 21 "Racketeering activity" includes any
of the enumerated crimes under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), such as murder,
gambling, arson, robbery, drug smuggling, human trafficking, and
terrorism. 22 A "pattern of racketeering activity" requires at least two
racketeering acts within a statutorily prescribed time period23 that are
related and pose a threat of continued criminal activity. 24
Although the RICO statute contains both civil and criminal
provisions, scholars cite the expansive remedies and flexible evidentiary
barriers under civil RICO as a more effective means of disrupting the
activities of a criminal enterprise than criminal RIC0. 25 RICO's criminal
provisions generally only provide for fines and imprisonment, 26 whereas
18

18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2012).

19

See id.

20

Id. § 1961.
21
See id.§§ 1961(4), (5).
22
As of 2001, racketeering activity specifically includes acts of terrorism. Id.§ 2332(b).
23
Usually five or ten years depending on the crime. See id. § 1961(5).
24
See id. § 1961. There must be "something to a RICO pattern beyond simply the number of
predicate acts involved." See H.J. Inc. v. NW Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989). "[T]o prove a pattern
of racketeering activity a ... prosecutor must show that the racketeering predicates ... amount to or
pose a threat of continued criminal activity." Id. at 239.
25
Daniel Hoppe, Racketeering After Morrison: Extraterritorial Application Of Civil Rico, 107
NORTHWESTERN UNIV. L. REV. 1375, 1382 (2013).
26
Up to twenty years in prison and fines of up to $25,000. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963. Criminal
prosecutions require prior approval from the Department of Justice's Organized Crime and Gang
Section (OCGS). See DEr'T OF JusncE, U.S. ATT'Y MANUAL§ 9-110.101-9-110.900 (2012).
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the civil provisions entitle private citizens to compensatory and treble
damages, and civil sanctions such as forcing the violator to divest all
assets in the enterprise or forcing the dissolution of the enterprise
itself. 27 In addition to having a greater range of sanctions under civil -as
opposed to criminal - RICO, there are also fewer barriers to overcome
when bringing a civil RICO suit. 28 For example, the government's
bureaucratic approval process and limited resources significantly
limit the number of criminal RICO suits that can be brought, whereas
private RICO suits suffer no such limitations. 29 Furthermore, civil RICO
plaintiffs enjoy a more liberal discovery process and a lower burden
of proof than government prosecutors in criminal RICO suits. 30 Thus,
the true source of RICO' s power to disrupt the activities of criminal
enterprises rests on the statute's civil provisions.
B.

THE HISTORY AND CURRENT JumcIAL FRAMEWORK ON RICO'S
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION

Although organized crime transcends national borders, and
although Congress has never expressly limited RICO' s territorial scope,
courts currently restrict the civil provisions of the statute to the territorial
boundaries of the United States. 31 The doctrine of extraterritoriality,
which concerns the application of domestic law to foreign conduct,
is highly controversial and increasingly important as international
trade and investment continues to rise, and multinational enterprises
continue to multiply. 32 Two significant Supreme Court precedents
caused a wide discrepancy in the extraterritorial applicability of RICO
depending on whether the civil or criminal provisions gave rise to
the claim. Courts interpret the famous Morrison decision of 2010 as
restricting civil RICO domestically, while courts consistently extend
the 1922 Bowman decision to support liberally applying criminal RICO
abroad. 33 Section 1 overviews the application of RICO extraterritorially
before and after the Morrison decision, Section 2 discusses the liberal
application of criminal RICO extraterritorially, and Section 3 highlights
See 18 U.S.C. § 1964; Organized Crime Control: Hearings on S.30, and Related Proposals, Relating to
the Control of Organized Crime in the United States, BEFORE SuBCOMM. No. s OF THE H. COMM. ON THE

27

JumcIARY, 91ST CoNG. 106.-07 (1970) (discussing the need for a broad range of flexible remedies).
28 Hoppe, supra note 25, at 1382.
29 See id. at 1380; Gerard E. Lynch, How Useful Is Civil RICO in the Enforcement of Criminal Law 35
VILLANOVA L. REV. 929, 937 (1990).
30 Civil plaintiffs must only prove guilt by a preponderance of the evidence, whereas in criminal
RICO cases, government must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and obtain warrants for
evidence collection. See Hoppe, supra note 25, at 1382.
31 See id. at 1383.
32 See David H. Small, Managing Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Problems: The United States Government
Approach, 50 L. & CoNTEMP. PRoBs. 283 (1988).
33 See infra Section II.B.1 and B.2.
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specific language within RICO that evidences Congress' intent to apply
RICO extraterritorially.
1. THE

STRICT DOMESTIC RESTRICTIONS ON CIVIL RICO

The jurisprudence on extraterritorial civil RICO has been anything
but consistent, with courts liberally applying civil RICO extraterritorially
before 2010, and then completely restricting RICO domestically after the
Supreme Court's 2010 Morrison opinion. The judicial establishment of
a "conducts and effects" test to determine when RICO applied abroad
in the 1990s ended decades of confusion about RICO's extraterritorial
application. The Second Circuit prompted the creation of this test when
it first noted in 1991 that "the mere fact that the corporate defendants are
foreign entities does not immunize them from the reach of RIC0." 34 This
conducts and effects test warranted RICO's extraterritorial application
"if conduct material to the completion of the racketeering occur[ed]
in the United States, or if significant effects of the racketeering [we]
re felt here." 35 The test was not limitless, however, as it required that
"the conduct occurring in, or directed at, the United States ... was not
an insubstantial or preparatory part of the overall looting scheme, but
the actual means of its consummation." 36 This test was widely adopted
amongst U.S. federal courts from the 1990s through2010, 37 and scholars
credited this test with affording RICO the teeth necessary to ward of
foreign criminal activity that impacted the United States significantly. 38
Moreover, scholars commended the test as a tool that ensured courts
based their RICO jurisdiction determinations off nuanced analyses of
each extraterritorial crime's effect on the United States-as opposed
to the arbitrary civil versus criminal bright-line jurisdictional rules
imposed in the post-Morrison framework. 39
Despite the culminating and widespread acceptance of the
conducts and effects test to determine when RICO applied abroad,
civil RICO's application has been limited to domestic conduct since
the 2010 Morrison opinion. In Morrison, which dealt exclusively
with securities laws, foreign investors purchased shares of a foreign
company on a foreign exchange and later brought a securities fraud
34

Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 475, 478 (2d. Cir. 1991).
See Liquidation Comm'n of Banco Intercontinental SA v. Renta, 540 F.3d 1339 (ll'h Cir. 2008).
36
See Liquidation Comm'n, 540 F.3d at 1352.
37
See e.g., id. at 1339; S.A. v. Alvarez Renta, 530 F.3d 1339, 1351-52 (11th Cir. 2008) (adopting
the "widely accepted view ... that RICO may apply extraterritorially if conduct material to
the completion of the racketeering occurs in the United States, or if significant effects of the
racketeering are felt here"); Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc., 379 F.3d 654, 663-64 (9th Cir. 2004)
(listing several cases that have applied the conducts and effects test).
38
See infra, page 7.
35

39

See id.
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claim in a U.S. court under section lO(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.40 Before Morrison reached the Supreme Court, the District
Court dismissed the claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and
the Second Circuit affirmed, applying the conducts and effects test to
conclude that the tie between the United States and the alleged fraud
was too attenuated for lO(b) to apply. 41 The Supreme Court affirmed the
decision but rejected the conducts and effects" test, arguing instead
that "legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant
to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States." 42
The Court then applied this presumption against extraterritorial
application to the Securities Exchange Act, finding no affirmative
indication" in the statute that Congress intended Section lO(b) to
apply extraterritorially. 43 Specifically, the Court found that Congress's
primary concern in passing the statute was "not upon the place where
the deception originated, but upon purchases and sales of securities in
the United States." 44
/1

/1

The Morrison presumption, although raised in the securities law
context, instantly shook up the jurisprudence on the extraterritorial
application of RICO. Lower courts view Morrison as a rule requiring
courts to presume that a statute only applies within the United States
absent a clear indication of an extraterritorial application." 45 Because
Congress did not expressly state that RICO applies extraterritorially,
almost every court to entertain an extraterritorial civil RICO claim since
Morrison has dismissed the suit. 46 Just two months after Morrison, a
federal district court applied the presumption to deny RICO jurisdiction
over a foreign enterprise, citing the absence of specific statutory mention
of foreign enterprises" as the reason. 47 Soon afterwards, the Second
Circuit applied Morrison to dismiss allegations of corruption and
bribery against Russian government officials, and found that "simply
alleging that some domestic conduct occurred cannot support a claim
of domestic application," and that the slim contacts with the United
States" were "insufficient to support extraterritorial application" of
RIC0. 48 Several more courts applied Morrison to dismiss extraterritorial
civil RICO claims shortly afterwards. 49 Moreover, in 2013 the Supreme
/1

/1

/1

40

See Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).

41

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

42

43
44
45

46
47

48
49

at 2875-76.
at 2877.
at 2883.
at 2884.
at 2878.

See e.g., Cedeno, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 474; Norex, 631 F.3d at 33.
Cedeno, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 473.
Norex, 631 F.3d at 33 (emphasis added).
See e.g., European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 2011 WL 843957, at *4 (E.D.N.Y Mar. 8, 2011)

(holding that extraterritorial application of RICO is prohibited).
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Court relied on Morrison to specifically reinforce the presumption
against extraterritoriality in the context of the Alien Tort Statute, which
further indicates the Supreme Court's unwavering commitment to
continue to restrict statutes domestically. 50
2.

THE LIBERAL EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF CRIMINAL RICO

Contrary to the domestic restrictions placed on civil RICO, when
a criminal RICO claim is brought against extraterritorial conduct,
the government can almost always cite the 1922 Bowman Supreme
Court opinion to obtain extraterritorial jurisdiction. The Bowman
opinion permitted courts to apply criminal statutes extraterritorially
in certain limited cases, even if the statute itself did not appear to
apply extraterritorially. 51 Today, Bowman casts some doubt as to
whether the Morrison presumption ought to apply in criminal cases. 52
Morrison neither overruled Bowman nor even mentioned it, 53 so courts
generally treat Bowman as an exception to the Morrison rule. 54 Some
government attorneys even argue that there is a presumption in favor
of extraterritorial application when it concerns criminal defendants. 55
Although the Bowman opinion was limited to situations where the
government was a victim of the extraterritorial criminal conduct, 56
courts consistently cite Bowman to exempt criminal cases as a whole
from domestic restrictions. 57 The reason for this extension of Bowman
See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (relying on Morrison to hold that the
Alien Tort Statute does not permit federal courts to recognize a cause of action for torts committed
by aliens abroad).
51
United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922).
52
The Second Circuit asserted in two post-Morrison cases that the presumption does not apply to
criminal matters. See United States v. Siddiqui, 699 F.3d 690, 700 (2d Cir. 2012)); United States v.
Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108, 118 (2d Cir. 2011).
53
United States v. Carson, No. SACR 09-00077-JVS, 2011 WL 7416975, at *7 (CD. Cal. Sept. 20,
2011).
54
See, e.g., United States v. Weingarten, 632 F.3d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 2011) (disregarding Morrison
in favor of the reasoning in Bowman); United States v. Singhal, 876 F. Supp. 2d 82, 97 (D.D.C.
2012) (declining to extend Morrison beyond§ lO(b), instead applying Bowman to allegations of
mail fraud); United States v. Campbell, 798 F. Supp. 2d 293, 303 (D.D.C. 2011) ("Despite the
emphasis of Morrison that the presumption against extraterritoriality applies 'in all cases,' recent
jurisprudence has developed with nary a mention of Bowman.").
55
See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Limited Rehearing En Banc at 3, Norex
Petrol. Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 631F.3d29 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 07-v4553-vcv) 63.
56
See United States v. Gatlin, 216 F.3d 207, 211 n.5 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v. Philip Morris
USA, Inc., 783 F. Supp. 2d 23, 28 n.6 (D.D.C. 2011); United States v. Martinelli, 62 M.J. 52, 58
(C.A.A.F. 2005); Ellen S. Podgor & Daniel M. Filler, International Criminal Jurisdiction in the TwentyFirst Century: Rediscovering United States v. Bowman, 44 SAN DrnGo L. REv. 585, 595 (2007).
57
See, e.g., Siddiqui, 699 F.3d at 700 (2d Cir. 2012) ("The ordinary presumption that laws do not
apply extraterritorially has no application to criminal statutes."); Al Kassar, 660 F.3d at 118 ("The
presumption that ordinary acts of Congress do not apply extraterritorially, does not apply to
criminal statutes."); United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56 at 87 (2d Cir. 2003)("Congress is presumed
to intend extraterritorial application of criminal statutes" that comply with Bowman's test").
50
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in the criminal RICO context is inconsistent among courts. Some courts
infer that Congress intended to provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction
over foreign criminal offenses that cause domestic harm. 58 Other courts
stretch Bowman further, finding criminal RICO has extraterritorial
application whenever enterprises affect foreign commerce, 59 and
a few courts find no domestic presumption "where the legislation
implicates concerns that are not inherently domestic." 6° Furthermore,
judges within the same court differ in their interpretations of Bowman. 61
Regardless of which interpretation of Bowman courts use, instances
where courts decline to apply criminal statutes extraterritorially are
now the exception rather than the rule. 62 The liberal interpretation of
Bowman and the restrictive interpretation of Morrison together cause
the significant discrepancy in the extraterritorial applicability of civil
and criminal RICO today. 63
3.

CONGRESS INTENDED TO APPLY RICO ExTRATERRITORIALLY

Despite the aforementioned confusion courts face in determining
whether RICO applies abroad, RICO's legislative history indicates
that Congress designed the entire statute to have extraterritorial
application. 64 Congress enacted RICO with the focus of alleviating
the effects of organized crime on the United States, but nowhere in
the statute did Congress restrict RICO to the territorial boundaries of
the United States. 65 Congress was careful to avoid limiting language
throughout RICO, which the imbedded statutory instruction that
RICO is "to be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes"
clearly demonstrates. 66 Furthermore, the Supreme Court and lower
See United States v. MacAllister, 160 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 1998); United States v. Plummer,
221F.3d1298, 1304-05 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134, 136-38 (5th Cir. 1980).
59
See Leija-Sanchez, 602 F.3d at 800; Carson, 2011 WL 7416975, at *8.
60
United States v. Corey, 232 F.3d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 2000).
61
Compare United States v. al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108, 118 (2d Cir. 2011) ("The presumption that
ordinary acts of Congress do not apply extraterritorially does not apply to criminal statutes.") with
Kollias v. D & G Marine Maint., 29 F.3d 67, 71 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that Bowman "should be read
narrowly" such that "only criminal statutes ... relating to the government's power to prosecute
wrongs committed against it, are exempt from the presumption [against extraterritoriality]").
62
David Keenan & Sabrina P. Shroff, Taking the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality Seriously, 45
LOYOLA UNIV. CHICAGO L. J. 72, 84 (2013).
63
Although the discrepancy is still real, recent decisions indicate a re-evaluation amongst courts
of the applicability of the Morrison presumption to criminal RICO. See, e.g., United States v. Chao
Fan Xu, 706 F.3d 965, 974-5 (9th Cir. 2013) ("we begin the present analysis with a presumption that
RICO does not apply extraterritorially in a civil or criminal context.").
64
See Russell Squire & Susannah Ostlund, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 49 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1157, 1158 (2012).
65
See United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 99 (1922) (that the "probable place" for the commission
of an offense lies outside the United States indicates that Congress intended to apply that offense
extraterritorially); accord United States v. Delgado-Garcia, 374 F.3d 1337, 1345 (D.C. Cir. 2004);
United States v. Plummer, 221F.3d1298, 1305 (11th Cir. 2000).
66
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947.
58
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federal courts frequently note that Congress intended for RICO to
apply broadly. 67
Furthermore, the text of RICO does not impose a domestic injury
requirement and broadly permits recovery by "[a]ny person injured
in his business or property." 68 Similarly, RICO's text does not impose
a domestic enterprise limitation, as RICO' s unequivocal language
covers any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which
affect, interstate or foreign commerce." 69 The express reference to
foreign commerce within RICO is also indicative of Congress' intent
to apply RICO extraterritorially. 7° Congress also recognized the
international nature of organized crime by including an enumerated
list of predicate acts in RICO's definition of "racketeering activity"
that have an inherently international aspect. 71 Lastly, RICO's legislative
history confirms that Congress was concerned with the harmful impact
international organized crime has on the United States and its people. 72
In the Senate Committee Hearings, Congress consistently referenced the
activities of the Cosa Nostra and the Sicilian Mafia as examples of what
RICO was aimed at combating. 73 Absent extraterritorial application,
RICO could not combat the very criminal activity Congress was most
worried about.
/1

II. ANALYSIS
The result of the domestic restriction on civil RICO and the
discrepancy between civil and criminal RICO' s applicability
extraterritorially is a significant and unsupported weakening of RICO's
power to combat organized crime. Section A details why the current
judicial framework for determining RICO' s extraterritorial application
is unsupported and harmful. Section B then proposes an amendment to
RICO that will clarify decades of confusing RICO jurisprudence, while
upholding the legislative intent behind RICO and returning statutory
power to U.S. victims of international organized crime.
See, e.g., Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 660 (2008) ("We have repeatedly
refused to adopt narrowing constructions of RICO to make it conform to a preconceived notion of
what Congress intended to proscribe.")
68
18 U.S.C. § 1964( c).
69
18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(c).
70
See Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 371-72 (2005) (noting that a statute that "punishes
frauds executed 'in interstate or foreign commerce,' ... is surely not [one] in which Congress had
only 'domestic concerns in mind.").
71
Such as drug smuggling, sex trafficking, money laundering, and various immigration crimes.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).
72
See Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947.
73
See 1970 Crime and Control Act Hearings, supra note 27, at 152, 157 (statement of John N.
Mitchell, Att'y Gen. of the United States).
67

Vol. 7.1

61

LEGISLATION & POLICY BRIEF

A. CRITIQUE OF THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK COURTS USE TO APPLY
RICO ExTRATERRITORIALLY

Supreme Court precedent, prudence, and Congress' intent in
enacting RICO does not support courts' disparate extraterritorial
application of RICO's civil and criminal provisions. 74 Courts should
not arbitrarily dissect the extraterritorial application of statutes along
civil and criminal lines. 75 Courts should rather determine whether the
statute in its entirety applies extraterritorially. 76 The First Circuit used
this exact reasoning to conclude that civil and criminal antitrust cases
should be treated equally with regard to extraterritoriality, explaining
that "it is a fundamental interpretive principle that identical words or
terms used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the
same meaning." 77 Civil and criminal RICO are premised on the same
substantive conduct and are grounded in the same statutory language
of the same Act, and therefore should have equal extraterritorial
application.
Even if a disparate treatment of civil and criminal RICO were
supportable, the Supreme Court's Morrison and Bowman opinions
should not be the cited support. 78 The limited "fundamental principle"
of jurisdiction that the Bowman court employed only permitted
extraterritorial jurisdiction over criminal conduct that targeted the U.S.
government. 79 Citing Bowman to permit the extraterritorial application
of all criminal RICO cases is therefore a significant divergence from
the Bowman court's original intention. Moreover, Morrison does not
support the domestic restriction of civil RICO. Morrison does not
bar extraterritorial application of U.S. statutes, but merely imparts a
presumption against extraterritoriality that can be rebutted by a clear
indication" that the statute extends beyond the domestic sphere. 80
The combination of Congress' broad language, 81 preoccupation with
the Sicilian Mafia during RICO's enactment, and emphasis on foreign
commerce clearly indicates" Congress' intent to apply the statute
extraterritorially. 82 Thus, Morrison does not preclude the application of
/1

/1

74
75
76

See, supra Section II.B. (discussing the current disparate treatment of civil and criminal RICO).
See Keenan & Shroff, supra note 62, at 86.
See United States v. Nippon Paper Industries Co., 109 F.3d 1, 7 (1997).

77

Id. at4.

78

See id.
See Podgor & Filler, supra note 56, at 595.
See Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010).

79

80
81

Specifically, the congressional instruction to "liberally construe" RICO provisions to effectuate
the statute's remedial purpose. See, supra Section II.B.3.
82
See, id. (highlighting the word choice Congress used in RICO that indicate the statutes
applicability to extraterritorial criminal activity); Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947 (1970)
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civil RICO to extraterritorial conduct and Bowman does not support the
automatic application of criminal RICO to extraterritorial conduct.
In addition to being unsupported, the domestic restriction of civil
RICO severely diminishes the effectiveness of RICO in combating
organized crime that affects the United States and its people. Because
courts restrict RICO' s extraterritorial application to the statute's
criminal provisions, only the government may currently bring such
extraterritorial suits-not private citizens. 83 Resource restrictions and
multi-layered bureaucratic processes significantly limit the number of
extraterritorial RICO suits the government can bring, which can result
in many RICO violations slipping away unpunished. 84 Additionally,
when the government prosecutes under criminal RICO the significant
rights afforded to criminal defendants considerably lowers the chances
of a successful conviction. 85 Furthermore, because investigations of
conduct that occurred abroad are often time consuming and expensive,
the high standards of proof in criminal trials render a successful
extraterritorial criminal RICO claim even more challenging. 86
The domestic restrictions on civil RICO also deny U.S. victims of
extraterritorial organized crime the ability to individually seek justice
or compensation through RIC0. 87 In a case like Pan Am 103, where,
although no level of monetary relief could fix the pain the loss of their
beloved family members caused them, private RICO suits could at
least provide a sense of individual power in bringing these criminals to
justice. 88 Under the current framework these U.S. victims, whose lives
were forever changed on the fatal day that Pan Am went down, have
no such recourse. Thus, the current framework courts use to determine
whether to entertain an extraterritorial RICO claim is unsupported by
case law and detrimental to the effectiveness of the statute.
B.

PROPOSAL: AN AMENDMENT THAT CLARIFIES RICO's APPLICABILITY
TO EXTRATERRITORIAL CONDUCT

The harm that the disparate extraterritorial application of civil and
criminal RICO causes, paired with the lack of statutory or judicial support
for that discrepancy, necessitates a more effective and supportable
framework for determining when both civil and criminal RICO apply
83
84

See, supra Section II.A (discussing the civil and criminal provisions of RICO).
See id.

Because of the significant disparity in evidentiary standards and discovery rules. See, supra
Section II.A

85

86
87
88

See id.
See Lynch, supra note 29, at 937.
See, supra Section I.
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extraterritorially. This Paper proposes an amendment to RICO that
clarifies the extent that RICO as a whole applies extraterritorially, and
clarifies the parallel treatment of civil and criminal RICO' s applicability
to extraterritorial conduct. Section 1 details the proposed amendment,
Section 2 discusses the advantages of the amendment, and Section 3
considers potential concerns that the amendment may give rise to.
1. THE

LANGUAGE OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT

The proposed RICO amendment would (1) express that the
statute as a whole applies extraterritorially, (2) detail the limits of that
extraterritorial application, and (3) delineate that RICO's civil and
criminal provisions are equally applicable to extraterritorial conduct.
The amendment uses a slightly modified version of the logic-based
conducts and effects" test 89 to determine when RICO as a whole applies
extraterritorially. The original conducts and effects test permitted the
extraterritorial application of RICO suits against criminal activity that
was substantially planned on U.S. soil, or that had a substantial impact
within the United States. 90 The proposed amendment expands the
second element of the test to include conduct that substantially impacts
lawful residents of the United States, even if the harm occurs abroad.
The language of the proposed amendment is as follows:
11

18 U.S. Code§ 1969 - Extraterritorial Application
(a) The jurisdiction of this statute extends to conduct outside the
territory of the United States in the following two situations:
(1) the enterprise substantially conducts the preparation of
at least one of its racketeering acts within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States; or
(2) at least one of the racketeering acts has a substantial effect on
a lawful resident of the United States, regardless of whether
they are located abroad or at home at the time.
(b) The civil and criminal provisions of this statute shall have

equal extraterritorial application in the situations delineated in
subsections (a)(l)-(2).
2.

ADVANTAGES OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT

The proposed amendment eradicates the core concerns that
plague the current framework courts use to determine when RICO
See, supra Section II.B.1 (discussing the widespread support of the conducts and effects test
prior to 2010).
90
See id.; Liquidation Comm'n ofBanco Intercontinental SA v. Renta, 540F.3d1339, 1339 (ll'h Cir.
2008).

89
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applies extraterritorially, and the amendment comports with Supreme
Court precedent, congressional intent, and international law. 91 By
clearly expressing RICO' s applicability to extraterritorial conduct, the
proposed amendment removes RICO from the Morrison discussion
altogether and avoids the presumption against extraterritoriality. 92
The proposed amendment also comports with the Bowman court's
"protective principle" 93 of jurisdiction because Section (a)(2) 94 permits
RICO prosecutions whenever the crime substantially impacts the
United States or its residents, even if it occurs wholly extraterritorially.
By bypassing the Morrison presumption altogether and comporting
with the limited interpretation of Bowman, the proposed amendment
engenders a nuanced framework that avoids this arbitrary bright-line
distinction between civil and criminal RICO that the current framework
contains. 95
The extraterritorial extension of RICO contained in the proposed
amendment also finds support in customary international law, which
permits a nation to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over crimes that
affect that nation's own people, even if the crime occurs outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the nation. 96 Moreover, by extending power
to individuals to file RICO suits against organized crime that affects
them abroad, the proposed amendment significantly bolsters RICO' s
power and flexibility to combat the constant threat that international
criminal enterprises pose. 97 This extraterritorial extension of civil
RICO in turn bolsters the deterrence value of the RICO statute because
members of international criminal enterprises will become aware that
they are subject to individual suits from every U.S. resident that their
crimes substantially impact. 98 Relatedly, permitting civil plaintiffs to
file extraterritorial RICO suits as they arise will counteract the RICO
See, supra Section III.A (discussing how the current framework decreases the effectiveness of
RICO and strips U.S. victims of international organized crime of their power under RICO).
92
Morrison only applies in situations where Congress did not clearly indicate that a statute applies
extraterritorially. See Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 3878 (2010).
93
The protective principle requires the extraterritorial application of domestic criminal statutes
whenever the case concerns threats to our nation. See United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 99
(1922).
94
See, supra Section III.B.l.
95
Courts currently apply erroneous extensions of Morrison and Bowman to instill bright-line rules
between the extraterritorially application of civil and criminal RICO. See, supra Section II.B.1 and
B.2.
96
See, supra Section III.B.1 (proposed amendment Section (a)(l)); John McCarthy, The Passive
Personality Principle and Its Use in Combatting International Terrorism, 13 FORDHAM INTL L. J. 298
(1989).
97
See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Overview of the Law Enforcement Strategy to Combat International
Organized Crime (2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag!speeches/2008/ioc-strategy-publicoverview.pdf.
98
See, supra Section II.A; Hoppe, supra note 25 at 138.
91
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violations that slip by unpunished as a result of the government's
limited resources and procedural constraints. 99 Additionally, these civil
extraterritorial RICO suits may result in more convictions than those
that currently prevail under criminal RICO counterparts due to the
lower burdens of proof and fewer procedural and evidentiary barriers
applicable in civil trials. 100
Lastly, the proposed amendment empowers U.S. victims of
international organized crime to seek justice against, and compensation
from, the perpetrators those crimes. In the context of economically
motivated crime, the proposed amendment encourages individual
U.S. residents to enter international business adventures, because these
individuals can rely on RICO as a tool to protect themselves should any
racketeering acts be directed at their companies outside U.S. borders.
This climate of economic confidence was one of Congress' express
goals in enacting RIC0. 101 Overall, the proposed RICO amendment
clarifies decades of confusing and inconsistent case law and engenders
a nuanced and logical framework for determining when RICO applies
extraterritorially that optimizes RICO' s effectiveness. 102
3.

POTENTIAL CRITICISMS OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT

The jurisdictional extensions contained in the proposed amendment
are controversial, and will likely raise three related criticisms. Critics
may argue: (1) the nature of criminal provisions warrants their
more liberal extraterritorial application than civil provisions; (2) the
amendment poses a needless expansion of U.S. jurisdiction; and (3) this
expansion could result in a flood of litigation.
Within the RICO context, the disparate treatment of the civil and
criminal provisions is not warranted. In some contexts an expansive
interpretation of criminal provisions and restrictive interpretation
of civil provisions may be beneficial to increase the deterrent value
of the statute while reducing fears of frivolous floods of litigation. 103
In the RICO context, however, this disparate interpretation of civil
and criminal provisions is unwarranted. Racketeering acts are rarely
violent in nature. Rather, the bulk of racketeering activity is economic
in nature, and thus do not carry the same connotations that lead to
See, supra Section II.A; Hoppe, supra note 25 at 1380; Lynch, supra note 29, at 937.
See Hoppe, supra note 25, at 1380 (explaining the difference between criminal and civil RICO).
101
See, supra Sectionl.C.A (discussing Congress' motive for enacting RICO).
102
See, supra Section II.B (highlighting the inconsistent treatment of RICO' s extraterritorial

99

100

application since 1970).
See Frederick C. Boucher, Closing the Rico Floodgates in the Aftermath of Sedima, 31 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 133 (1986).

103
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the societal desire for the government to have greater flexibility in
fighting for justice against criminal defendants. 104 Moreover, Congress
wrote RICO with broad civil remedies specifically to allow victims of
organized crime to protect themselves by individually enforcing the
statute. 105
The exercise of jurisdiction in the proposed amendment is also not
umestrained, because jurisdiction only extends to instances where the
effects of the racketeering activity are substantial, meaning quantifiably
large using some objective standard. 106 Losing a family member on a
flight that organized terrorists bomb is an unequivocally significant
effect, yet a small stockholder of a company that suffers from an alleged
RICO violation that lowers the price of the company's shares is not such
a clear cut argument of a substantial effect. Only time spent grappling
with the amendment through specific case analyses will clarify and
define the amendment's boundaries, but the desire for a bright-line
rule is no reason to avoid this nuanced process.
Lastly, history does not reveal a correlation between extraterritorial
application of RICO and floods of RICO litigation. Prior to Morrison,
when the conducts and effects test permitted widespread extraterritorial
application of civil RICO, there were no such "floods." 107 Critics of
RICO' s broad scope periodically claim that RICO' s civil provisions result
in excessive litigation domestically, but these criticisms do not focus on
the extraterritorial reach of the statute, rather the criticisms focus on the
relative ease with which RICO elements are met. 108 Nonetheless, courts
dismiss many civil RICO lawsuits on Rule 12(b) motions, consequently
minimizing the burden on federal courts that such suits present. 109 The
extraterritorial application of civil RICO would therefore enjoy the
benefit of such broad application-namely deterrence against foreign
criminals, and empowerment of U.S. victims of international organized
crime-without suffering the harm of excessive litigation.
III.

CONCLUSION

The rapid expansion of transnational organized crime necessitates
the availability of civil and criminal RICO to combat threats that
104
105

See18 U.S. Code§ 1961.
See, supra Section II.B.3 (discussing RICO's legislative intent and language of the statute);

Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947.
See, supra Section III.B.1 (discussing the language of the proposed amendment).
107
See Boucher, supra note 103.

106

108
109

See id.
See id. For example, of 145 civil RICO cases filed in the Southern District of New York from2004

to 2007, all 36 cases that were resolved on the merits resulted in judgments against the plaintiffs.
Thirty cases were dismissed on Rule 12(b)(6) motions. Id.
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occur extraterritorially. Furthermore, Supreme Court precedent,
prudence, international law, and RICO's legislative intent support the
extraterritorial application of the RICO statute. The proposed RICO
amendment achieves this objective by clearly stating that RICO applies
extraterritorially, defining the limits of that extraterritorial application,
and delineating that criminal and civil RICO apply equally to such
extraterritorial conduct.
The amendment avoids the Morrison presumption altogether and
the amendment comports with the protective principle of Bowman
by ensuring that extraterritorial organized crime that targets the
U.S. government may be prosecuted. Furthermore, international law
supports the amendment's application of RICO to situations where
our nation's residents are victims of crimes abroad. The amendment
also finds support in the language of the RICO statute, as well as the
original intent behind the enactment of RICO in 1970-to combat the
Sicilian Mafia. Lastly and most importantly, the amendment reinforces
Congress' desire to invest power in private citizens and victims of these
crimes to individually protect the law, such as the hundreds of family
members who lost their loved ones on Pan Am flight 103.

